The short answer for a small accounting firm: if the job is getting documents in from clients, ShieldFive document requests do it this way. You send the client one link with a checklist of the documents you need, the client uploads from a phone or computer without creating an account, and each file is encrypted in their browser before upload. Firm seats are €29 per seat per month (€290 per seat per year) with no seat minimum and a 14-day trial. ShareFile's per-user plans start at $16.50 (Advanced) and $26 (Premium) per user per month billed annually, with a 3-user minimum.
| ShieldFive document requests | ShareFile (Progress) | |
|---|---|---|
| Best for | Small firms whose main need is collecting client documents | Firms that want a full client portal with e-signature and tax-software integrations |
| Price | €29 per seat per month or €290 per seat per year; no seat minimum; 14-day trial | Advanced $16.50, Premium $26 per user per month billed annually ($18.15 / $28.59 monthly); 3-user minimum |
| Client needs an account? | No: link plus a PIN sent separately | Not for a request link set to "Anyone"; client users log in to the portal |
| Encryption | Each file and filename encrypted in the client's browser to the firm's keys; we store only ciphertext and never hold your keys | AES-256 at rest with keys ShareFile manages by default; optional customer-managed keys still decrypt on ShareFile's servers |
| E-signature, tax-software integrations | No | Yes (KBA e-signature for Form 8879; CCH, Drake, Lacerte, ProSeries, UltraTax) |
| Third-party certifications | None yet; open crypto core and a published internal review | SOC 2 Type 2, ISO 27001, ISO 27701, PCI DSS |
ShareFile prices are from sharefile.com/pricing and the no-account request link from ShareFile's request-files documentation, both checked on 6 October 2026. ShieldFive's plans are on the pricing page; the request workflow is described on /request and in the one-page ShareFile comparison.
Progress Software bought ShareFile from Cloud Software Group in October 2024. It is a mature, workflow-deep product, and where it is stronger (workflow breadth, certifications, track record) this page says so.
What ShareFile actually is, and what "customer-managed keys" changes
ShareFile's standard cloud storage encrypts files with AES-256 at rest and TLS in transit. Each file gets a unique encryption key, and file keys are stored separately from the file data itself — a real control against someone with physical access to a storage server. By default, though, ShareFile (Progress) generates and holds those keys: the vendor's own security documentation describes this as ShareFile managing customer encryption keys as part of its standard SaaS offering, which means ShareFile's infrastructure can technically decrypt customer files.
ShareFile also offers customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) as a configurable option on its managed cloud storage zones, built on AWS KMS. A customer creates and controls the KMS master key and can revoke ShareFile's access to it at any time — a genuine and useful control, since it puts a kill switch in the customer's hands. But it is worth being precise about what this does and does not change: in the standard AWS KMS envelope-encryption pattern this class of feature uses, the customer's master key wraps a per-file data key, and ShareFile's own servers still request that data key, use it to encrypt or decrypt the file content, and perform the operation in plaintext on ShareFile's infrastructure before the file reaches or leaves the customer. That makes CMEK customer control over the master key, not client-side or zero-knowledge encryption — the distinction is who performs the cryptographic operation and where, not merely who owns the key. A separate on-premises option, the Storage Zones Controller, lets a customer host the storage layer itself, which is a different trust model again and the one involved in the vulnerabilities covered below.
Where ShareFile leads, honestly
ShareFile leads on breadth, maturity, and procurement safety. It has genuine, named third-party certifications — SOC 2 Type 2, ISO 27001, ISO 27701, PCI DSS v3.2.1 — plus a configurable HIPAA posture, all backers a security-conscious buyer's due-diligence checklist expects and can request evidence for. It has file-transfer integrations into the tax-prep tools accounting firms already run (CCH, Drake, Lacerte, ProSeries, UltraTax), built-in KBA-compliant e-signature for IRS Form 8879, and a storage-zone footprint spanning the US, EU (Dublin and Frankfurt), and several other regions on request. As part of Progress Software — a public company with over 86,000 customers added through the ShareFile deal and $240M+ in projected annual revenue from the business — it is about as low-procurement-risk a vendor as this category has, with a track record measured in decades rather than months.
Where it does not lead: the default trust model is provider-decryptable, not zero-knowledge. Customer-managed keys narrow that gap but don't close it — the operation still happens on ShareFile's servers. And no post-quantum cryptography is described anywhere in ShareFile's public documentation — the encryption on offer is entirely classical.
The 2026 Storage Zones Controller vulnerabilities
This is worth stating precisely, because the scope matters and overstating it would be its own kind of dishonesty. In April 2026, security researchers at watchTowr Labs disclosed two chainable vulnerabilities in ShareFile's Storage Zones Controller — the on-premises component some ShareFile customers run to keep the storage layer in their own infrastructure (AWS S3, Azure Blob, or a local network share) rather than on ShareFile's fully managed cloud: CVE-2026-2699, a pre-authentication access-control bypass (CVSS 9.8), and CVE-2026-2701, a remote-code-execution flaw (CVSS 9.1). Chained together, an unauthenticated attacker could reach restricted configuration pages and upload a malicious ASPX web shell, achieving full remote code execution without any credentials. The flaws affected the legacy 5.x branch (versions up to 5.12.3); Progress's rewritten 6.x branch, built on .NET Core, was not affected. A fix shipped in version 5.12.4 ahead of public disclosure. Independent scanning at the time found several hundred to tens of thousands of internet-exposed instances, depending on the scan methodology, concentrated in the US and Germany.
Separately, on 10 July 2026, Progress instructed customers still running Storage Zones Controller to immediately shut down the Windows servers hosting it, citing a distinct "credible external security threat." Progress stated it found no evidence of unauthorized access to customer data at the time of that notice.
Two scope points matter for a firm evaluating this: first, these vulnerabilities affect the self-hosted Storage Zones Controller deployment path, not ShareFile's fully managed cloud storage that most customers use by default — a firm on standard ShareFile-managed cloud storage was not exposed by this specific CVE chain. Second, a pre-auth RCE chain in a widely deployed on-premises component, however scoped, is the kind of finding that belongs in a vendor comparison rather than left to a firm's own security team to discover independently during a renewal cycle.
Where ShieldFive fits, and where it does not
For collecting documents, ShieldFive document requests send a client one link with a checklist; the client uploads without an account, the firm is emailed when files arrive, and on the Firm plan the client can get up to two reminders while required items are missing. For the rest of the account, ShieldFive encrypts files on the device before upload. Your password never reaches our servers: the browser turns it into a separate login value with Argon2id and sends only that, and the key that opens the vault is derived separately and stays on the device. That service remains part of the trust boundary, so this is not an absolute provider-cannot-decrypt guarantee. Web uploads default to ML-KEM-1024/XChaCha20-Poly1305 with AES-GCM fallback. Android also defaults to the hybrid format, with the same AES-GCM fallback, and reads both formats. The crypto core is open under Apache-2.0; the apps are not fully open source, and no external security audit is complete.
Where it does not fit: ShieldFive has no e-signature, no KBA, and no tax-software or practice-management integrations. It has not completed a third-party audit or certification — its evidence today is open code and a published internal review, not a SOC 2, ISO 27001, or any named certificate. There is no HIPAA Business Associate Agreement, so healthcare-adjacent work that needs a BAA on file still needs a HIPAA-specific arrangement ShareFile can offer and ShieldFive currently cannot. If what you're shopping for is a full client-portal-and-practice-management platform with an established compliance paper trail, ShareFile is the safer default and ShieldFive is not a drop-in replacement.
Which one fits your firm
Pick ShareFile if your firm needs the workflow depth — tax-software file transfer, KBA e-signature, a named SOC 2/ISO 27001 report your clients' own due-diligence process can request — and provider-managed encryption with an optional customer-held master key meets your confidentiality bar. If you run Storage Zones Controller on-premises, confirm you're on 5.12.4 or the 6.x branch and current on Progress's security advisories.
Consider ShieldFive if the job is collecting documents from clients who will not keep a portal login, and you want to pay per seat without a 3-user minimum. Review the client-code trust boundary above. It has no completed external security audit, and you will need existing tools for tax-software integration and e-signature.
A separate encrypted sharing tool can complement a workflow suite, but ShieldFive must not be used on the assumption that provider decryption is technically impossible. Review its client-code trust boundary, storage location and workflow limits before adopting it.
If you're evaluating the accounting-workflow suites more broadly, the accountant file sharing comparison (ShareFile, SmartVault, TaxDome and more) covers three more named tools, including ShareFile itself, on the same axes with tax-integration detail this page doesn't repeat. For the law-firm angle specifically, see secure file sharing for law firms; for HIPAA-touching work, see the HIPAA-compliant file sharing guide. If collecting documents from clients is the actual job, compare ShieldFive vs Content Snare, or see how ShieldFive is set up to collect documents from clients for accounting firms. If the shortlist is zero-knowledge tools rather than workflow suites, compare zero-knowledge storage providers on one set of axes.
Frequently asked questions
Is ShareFile zero-knowledge or end-to-end encrypted?
No, not by default. ShareFile's standard cloud storage encrypts files with AES-256 at rest and TLS in transit, but ShareFile generates and holds the encryption keys as part of its managed SaaS offering, so ShareFile's own infrastructure can technically decrypt customer files. That is provider-managed encryption, a real and useful control, but a different guarantee from zero-knowledge, where the provider is architecturally unable to decrypt regardless of intent.
What are ShareFile's customer-managed encryption keys, and are they zero-knowledge?
Customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) let a customer create and control the AWS KMS master key protecting their ShareFile data and revoke ShareFile's access to it at any time. That is a genuine control, but it is not client-side or zero-knowledge encryption: in this class of AWS KMS envelope-encryption setup, ShareFile's own servers still request the underlying data key and perform the actual encrypt/decrypt operation on ShareFile's infrastructure. The customer controls the master key; ShareFile still performs the cryptography.
Does ShareFile have post-quantum encryption?
Not that is described in ShareFile's public documentation as of August 2026. Its encryption is AES-256 combined with classical key-management mechanisms (AWS KMS); no post-quantum or quantum-resistant key exchange is mentioned anywhere in its published materials.
What were the 2026 ShareFile Storage Zones Controller vulnerabilities?
In April 2026, watchTowr Labs disclosed CVE-2026-2699 (a pre-auth access-control bypass, CVSS 9.8) and CVE-2026-2701 (remote code execution, CVSS 9.1) in ShareFile's on-premises Storage Zones Controller, versions up to 5.12.3 on the legacy 5.x branch; chained, they allowed unauthenticated remote code execution via a malicious file upload. A fix shipped in 5.12.4, and the newer 6.x branch was unaffected. Separately, on 10 July 2026, Progress instructed remaining Storage Zones Controller customers to shut down affected servers over a distinct "credible external security threat." Both affected the self-hosted Storage Zones Controller deployment path specifically, not ShareFile's standard managed cloud storage.
What does ShieldFive cost compared with ShareFile?
ShieldFive firm seats are €29 per seat per month or €290 per seat per year, with no seat minimum and a 14-day trial with everything unlocked; clients never pay. ShareFile lists Advanced at $16.50 and Premium at $26 per user per month billed annually ($18.15 and $28.59 billed monthly), each with a 3-user minimum, on its pricing page as of 6 October 2026. ShareFile's price includes workflow features ShieldFive does not have, such as e-signature and tax-software integrations.
Is ShieldFive a full replacement for ShareFile's workflow features?
No. ShieldFive covers collecting documents from clients: a request link with a checklist, no client account, files encrypted in the client's browser, email when files arrive and reminders on the Firm plan. It has no e-signature, no KBA and no tax-software integrations. Firms that rely on those keep ShareFile for them.